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Abstract—Phishing is a major problem on the Web. Despite
the significant attention it has received over the years, there has
been no definitive solution. While the state-of-the-art solutions
have reasonably good performance, they require a large amount
of training data and are not adept at detecting phishing attacks
against new targets.
In this paper, we begin with two core observations: (a) although
phishers try to make a phishing webpage look similar to its target,
they do not have unlimited freedom in structuring the phishing
webpage; and (b) a webpage can be characterized by a small set
of key terms; how these key terms are used in different parts
of a webpage is different in the case of legitimate and phishing
webpages. Based on these observations, we develop a phishing
detection system with several notable properties: it requires
very little training data, scales well to much larger test data,
is language-independent, fast, resilient to adaptive attacks and
implemented entirely on client-side. In addition, we developed
a target identification component that can identify the target
website that a phishing webpage is attempting to mimic. The
target detection component is faster than previously reported
systems and can help minimize false positives in our phishing
detection system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Phishing webpages (“phishs”) lure unsuspecting web surfers
into revealing their credentials. As a major security concern
on the web, phishing has attracted the attention of many
researchers and practitioners. There is a wealth of literature,
tools and techniques for helping web surfers to detect and
avoid phishing webpages. Nevertheless, phishing detection
remains an arms race with no definitive solution. State-of-the-
art large scale real-time phishing detection techniques [1] are
capable of identifying phishing webpages with high accuracy
(>99%) while achieving very low rates of misclassifying
legitimate webpages (<0.1%). However, many of these tech-
niques, which use machine learning, rely on millions of
static features, primarily taking the bag-of-words approach.
This implies two major weaknesses: (a) they need a huge
amount of labeled data to train their classification models;
and (b) they are language- and brand-dependent and not
very effective at identifying new phishing webpages targeting
brands that were not already observed in previous attacks.
Commercial providers of phishing detection solutions struggle
with obtaining and maintaining labeled training data. From
the deployability perspective, solutions that require minimal
training data are thus very attractive.
In this paper, we introduce a new approach that avoids these
drawbacks. Our goal is to identify whether a given webpage
is a phish, and, if it is, identify the target it is trying to mimic.
Our approach is based on two core conjectures:
• Modeling phisher limitations: To increase their chances
of success, phishers try to make their phish mimic its
target closely and obscure any signal that might tip off the
victim. However, in crafting the structure of the phishing
webpage, phishers are restricted in two significant ways.
First, external hyperlinks in the phishing webpage, espe-
cially those pointing to the target, are to domains outside
the control of phishers. Second, while phishers can freely
change most parts of the phishing page, the latter part
of its domain name is constrained as they are limited
to domains that the phishers control. We conjecture that
by modeling these limitations in our phishing detection
classifier, we can improve its effectiveness.
• Measuring consistency in term usage: A webpage can
be represented by a collection of key terms that occur
in multiple parts of the page such as its body text, title,
domain name, other parts of the URL etc. We conjecture
that the way in which these terms are used in different
parts of the page will be different in legitimate and
phishing webpages.
Based on these conjectures, we develop and evaluate a
phishing detection system. We use comparatively few (212)
but relevant features. This allows our system, even with very
little labeled training data, to have high accuracy and low
rate of mislabeling legitimate websites. By modeling inherent
phisher limitations in our feature set, the system is resilient
to adaptive attackers who dynamically change a phish to
circumvent detection. Our basic phishing detector component
(Section IV) does not require online access to centralized
information and is fast. Therefore, it is highly suited for a
privacy-friendly client-side implementation. Our target brand
identification component (Section V) uses a simple technique
to extract a set of keyterms characterizing a webpage and, in
case it is a phish, uses the keyterms set to identify its target.
Both components eschew the bag-of-words approach and are
thus not limited to specific languages or targeted brands.
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We claim the following contributions:
• a new set of features to detect phishing webpages (Sec-
tion IV-B) and a classifier, using these features, with
the following properties that distinguish it from previous
work:
– it learns a generalized model of phishing and legitimate
webpages from a small training set (few thousands).
– it is language- and brand-independent.
– it is resilient to adaptive attackers.
– its features are extracted only from information re-
trieved by a web browser from the webpage and it does
not require online access to centralized information.
Hence it admits a client-side-only implementation
that offers several advantages including (a) better
privacy, (b) real-time protection and (c) resilient to
phishing webpages that return different contents to
different clients.
• comprehensive evaluation of this system, showing that
its accuracy (>99%) and misclassification rate (<0.1%)
are comparable to prior work while using significantly
smaller training data. (Section VI-C)
• a fast target identification technique (Section V) for
phishing webpages with accuracy (90-97%) comparable
to previously reported techniques. It can also be used to
remove false positives from the basic phishing detection
component described above. (Section VI-D)
This research report is an extended version of an ICDCS 2016
paper [2]. A proof of concept of this technique has been
implemented as a phishing prevention browser add-on [3]
II. BACKGROUND
A. Phishing
Phishing refers to the class of attacks where a victim is lured
to a fake webpage masquerading as a target website and is
deceived into disclosing personal data or credentials. Phishing
campaigns are typically conducted using spam emails to drive
users to fake websites [4]. Impersonation techniques range
from technical subterfuges (email spoofing, DNS spoofing,
etc.) to social engineering. The former is used by technically
skilled phishers while unskilled phishers resort to the latter [5].
Phishing webpages mimic the look and feel of their target web-
sites [6]. In order to make the phishing webpages believable,
phishers may embed some content (HTML code, images, etc.)
taken directly from the target website and use relatively little
content that they themselves host [7]. This includes outgoing
links pointing to the target website. They also use keywords
referring to the target in different elements of the phishing
webpage (title, text, images, links) [4], [7]–[9]. In this paper,
our focus is on detection of phishing webpages created by an
attacker and hosted on his own web server or on someone
else’s compromised web server.
B. URL Structure
Webpages are addressed by a uniform resource locator
(URL). Fig. 1 shows relevant parts in the structure of a typical
URL. It begins with the protocol used to access the page.
The fully qualified domain name (FQDN) identifies the server
hosting the webpage. It consists of a registered domain name
(RDN) and prefix which we refer to as subdomains. A phisher
has full control over the subdomains portion and can set it to
any value. The RDN portion is constrained since it has to be
registered with a domain name registrar. RDN itself consists of
two parts: a public suffix1 (ps) preceded by a main level domain
(mld). The URL may also have a path and query components
which, too, can be changed by the phisher at will. We use the
term FreeURL to refer to those parts of the URL that are fully
controllable by the phisher.
protocol://[subdomains.]mld.ps[/path][?query]
FQDN
RDNFreeURL FreeURL
Fig. 1: Structure of a URL
Consider an example URL:
https://www.amazon.co.uk/ap/signin? encoding=UTF8
We can identify the following components:
• protocol = https
• FQDN = www.amazon.co.uk
• RDN = amazon.co.uk
• mld = amazon
• FreeURL = {www, /ap/signin? encoding=UTF8}
C. Data Sources
From analyzing phishing webpages, we identify the follow-
ing data sources, available to a web browser when it loads a
webpage, that can be useful in detecting phishing webpages:
• Starting URL: the URL given to the user to access the
website. It can be distributed in emails, instant messages,
websites, documents, etc.
• Landing URL: the final URL pointing to the actual
content presented to the user in his web browser. This
is the URL present in the browser address bar when the
page is completely loaded.
• Redirection chain: the set of URLs crossed to go from
the starting URL to the landing URL (including both).
• Logged links: the set of URLs logged by the browser
while loading the page. They point to sources from which
embedded content (code, images, etc.) in the webpage are
loaded.
• HTML: the HTML source code of the webpage and
IFrames included in the page. We consider four elements
extracted from this source code:
– Text: text contained between <body> HTML tags
(actually rendered on user’s display).
– Title: text contained between <title> HTML tags (ap-
pears in the browser tab title).
– HREF links: the set of URLs representing outgoing
links in the webpage.
1Public Suffix List (https://publicsuffix.org/)
– Copyright: the copyright notice, if any, in Text.
• Screenshot: an image capture of the loaded webpage.
III. DESIGN OVERVIEW
Before describing the detailed design (in Sections IV and
V), we start with an overview.
A. Modeling Phisher Limitations
In Section II-B, we saw that even on systems they control,
phishers are constrained from freely constructing URLs to
pages they host. Similarly, in Section II-A, we saw that in
order to maximize the believability of their phishing sites,
phishers include content from URLs outside their control.
We conjecture that by taking these constraints and level of
control into account in selecting and grouping features for
our classification, we can improve classification performance.
Thus, we divide the data sources from Section II-C into
subcategories according to the level of control phishers may
have on them and the constraints on phishers.
Control: URLs from logged links and HREF links are subdi-
vided into internal and external according to their RDN. The
set of RDNs extracted from URLs involved in the redirection
chain are assumed to be under the control of the webpage
owner. Any URLs that include these RDNs are marked in-
ternal. Other RDNs are assumed to be possibly outside the
control of the webpage owner. URLs containing such RDNs
are marked external.
Constraints: Within a URL, we distinguish between RDN,
which cannot be freely defined by the webpage owner, and
(FreeURL), which can be.
B. Extracting Term Distributions
The primary technique of a phisher is essentially social
engineering: fooling a victim into believing that the phishing
webpage is the target [5]. Thus, it is plausible that lexical
analysis of the data sources will help in identifying phishing
webpages: we conjecture that legitimate webpages and phish-
ing webpages differ in the way terms are used in different
locations in those pages. To incorporate measurements of such
term usage consistency, we first define what “terms” are and
how they are extracted from a webpage. Let A be the set of
the 26 lowercase English letters: A = {a, b, c, ..., x, y, z}. We
extract terms from a data source as follows:
• canonicalize letter characters by mapping upper case
characters, accented characters and special characters to
a matching letter in A; e.g., { B, β, b`, bˆ } → b.
• split the input into substrings whenever a character c /∈ A
is encountered.
• throw away any substring whose length is less than 3.
Let T = An|n ≥ 3 be the set of all possible terms. Suppose
TS = {ti∈{1;m} ∈ T} was extracted from a data source S and
ti occurs with probability pi. The set of m pairs (ti, pi) ∈
T × ]0, 1] , i ∈ {1;m} represents the term distribution DS of
S.
Table I defines the term distributions we consider. The
external sources extrdn, extlog, extlink are those assumed
TABLE I: Term distributions
Distribution Data source
Dtext Text
Dtitle Title
Dcopyright Copyright notice
Dimage Webpage screenshot
Dstart Starting URL – FreeURL
Dland Landing URL – FreeURL
Dintlog Internal logged links – FreeURL
Dintlink Internal HREF links – FreeURL
Dstartrdn Starting URL – RDN
Dlandrdn Landing URL – RDN
Dintrdn Internal links (HREF and logged) – RDN
Dextrdn External logged links – RDN
Dextlog External logged links – FreeURL
Dextlink External HREF links – FreeURL
to be outside the control of the webpage owner. RDN data
sources startrdn, landrdn, intrdn are constrained by DNS
registration. The rest is controlled by the webpage owner
without constraints. Table II summarizes the level of control
and the constraints a webpage owner has on the data sources
of a webpage. The image data source is composed of terms
extracted by optical character recognition (OCR) from the
screenshot of a rendered webpage. It is used to address the
case of image-based webpages from which no text content
can be extracted.
TABLE II: Data sources control and constraints
Controlled Uncontrolled
Unconstrained
text extlog
title extlink
copyright
image
start
land
intlog
intlink
startrdn extrdn
Constrained landrdn
intrdn
C. Architecture
Our overall design consists of a phishing webpage detec-
tion system (Section IV) and a target identification system
(Section V). The phishing detection system is a classifier
that identifies phishing webpages based on a set of newly
introduced features. The target identification system identifies
if a given webpage is a phish by finding its target. Both
systems can be used in a pipeline: the phishing detection
system tentatively identifies a potential phish, which can be
fed to the target identification system to infer the purported
target. If a target is not found, then it can be deemed a false
positive.
IV. PHISHING DETECTION SYSTEM
We now describe how and why we select the set of features
we use in our phishing detection classifier.
A. Feature Set Requirements
We consider some facts of phishing detection in order to
deduce requirements that a feature set must have:
Generalizability: Accumulating ground truth phishing and
legitimate data is challenging. Phishing websites have very
short lifetimes [10] and can display different content depend-
ing on a browser’s user-agent or user’s geographic location.
Labeled phishing and legitimate resources are often defined
by URLs (e.g. PhishTank2). Assigning correct labels (phish,
non-phish) to these URLs is difficult. But even if the initial
labeling was done correctly, information on the pages pointed
by them can also evolve over time: a legitimate domain name
can be hijacked to host phishing content for a while or a
phishing domain name can be parked or changed to contain
empty content after a short uptime. Therefore, crawling a set of
labeled URLs to gather ground truth data often leads to noisy
datasets that further require manual checking and cleaning up.
Thus it is desirable to select a feature set that allows a model
to be learned from as small a training set as possible while
remaining applicable to far larger test datasets. Using a much
larger test set than the training set also allows the detection
and avoidance of overfitting [11].
Adaptability: Several automated classification techniques [1],
[12], [13] rely on a static set of features learned from a training
set such as the bag-of-words model or “term frequency-inverse
document frequency” (TF-IDF) [14] computation. Such fea-
ture models are language-dependent and vary with training
sets. Using such features shows [1] that certain terms such as
paypal are dominant features. Thus the efficacy of such models
on phishs that masquerade as previously unknown targets or
brands is questionable. In addition, phishers can adaptively
modify the content of their phish to circumvent detection by
such static models, e.g., by using words that typically occur
in legitimate webpages. An adaptable feature set must be
independent of learning instances, preferably defined manually
with motivated reasons, and be resilient to adaptive attacks.
Usability: It is desirable that features are computable on an
end user system without relying on online access to centralized
servers or proprietary data (e.g. Google PageRank). This
preserves user privacy since the scheme does not require users
to disclose their browsing history to an outside entity.
Computational Efficiency: Features must be quickly com-
putable to allow integration with real time detection systems
that do not impact users’ web surfing experience.
B. Computing Features
We now introduce 212 features and motivate their selection.
We intend to capture the constraints and degree of control
discussed earlier (Section III-A) as well as consistency check-
ing of term usage (Section III-B). We group features into five
categories (Table III).
URL: First we define nine statistical features related to the
lexical composition of URLs (Table IV). Feature 2 is meant to
identify strings in path and query that look like domain names.
2PhishTank (https://www.phishtank.com/)
TABLE III: Feature sets
Name Count Type
f1 106 URL
f2 66 Term usage consistency
f3 22 Usage of starting and landing mld
f4 13 RDN usage
f5 5 Webpage content
fall 212 Entire feature set
Phishing URL and domain name obfuscation techniques [8]
tend to produce long URLs composed of many terms. This
is the rationale for features 3-8. The popularity rank of the
domain (feature 9) is based on a fixed, previously downloaded
list of the Alexa top million domain names3. If a domain is
not in this list, feature 9 takes the default value of 1,000,001.
All nine features are extracted from the starting URL (9) and
landing URL (9). The mean, median and standard deviation
values are computed for features 3-9 on the following sets
of URLs: internal logged links, external logged links, internal
HREF links and external HREF links (4 ∗ 7 ∗ 3). Feature 1 is
computed on these sets as a ratio of URLs using https over
the total count of URLs for each set (4 ∗ 1). Feature 2 is
computed only for the starting and landing URLs. (Since URL
obfuscation techniques are effective only on URLs that are
visible to the user) Thus, the complete URL-based feature set
(f1) consists of 106 features: 9 + 9 + 4 ∗ (7 ∗ 3 + 1) = 106.
TABLE IV: URL features
# Description
1 protocol used (http/https)
2 count of dots ‘.’ in FreeURL
3 count of level domains
4 length of the URL
5 length of the FQDN
6 length of the mld
7 count of terms in the URL
8 count of terms in the mld
9 Alexa ranking of the RDN
Term usage consistency: The second set of features (f2)
captures the consistency of term usage between different types
(controlled vs. uncontrolled; constrained vs. unconstrained)
of data sources in the page. Since phishers cannot freely
define all elements of the webpage they serve to their victims,
they obfuscate only some elements by using key terms that
will deceive them. Using 12 term distributions (we discard
Dcopyright and Dimage) defined in Section III-B we define
66 features (12 ∗ 11/2) depicting the similarity of pairs of
sources by computing pairwise Hellinger Distance between
their distributions. The Hellinger Distance [15] is a metric
used to quantify the dissimilarity between two probabilistic
distributions P and Q. It is an instance of f -divergence that
is symmetric and bounded in [0, 1]. The value 1 represents
complete dissimilarity (P ∩Q = ∅) and the value 0 means that
P and Q are the same probabilistic distribution. The formula
of the Hellinger Distance in discrete space is given in Equation
(1).
3Alexa (http://www.alexa.com/)
H2(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
x∈P∪Q
(√
P (x)−
√
Q(x)
)2
(1)
Usage of starting and landing mld: Legitimate websites are
likely to register a domain name reflecting the brand or the
service they represent. However, phishers often use domain
names having no relation with their target [6]. Hence, we
expect the starting mld and/or the landing mld to appear in
several sources extracted from a legitimate webpage while
phishing webpages should not have this characteristic. We
define 22 features (f3) inferring the usage of the starting
and landing mld in the text, the title and FreeURL of the
logged links and HREF links. 12 binary features are set to
1 if the starting/landing mld appear in Dtext, Dtitle, Dintlog,
Dextlog, Dintlink or Dextlink (6*2); 10 features are the sum
of probability from terms of Dtitle, Dintlog, Dextlog, Dintlink
and Dextlink that are substrings of starting/landing mld (5*2).
Dtext is not considered since it is often composed of many
short irrelevant terms that match several parts of a mld.
RDN usage: We define 13 features (f4) related to RDN usage
consistency. We compute statistics related to the use of similar
and different RDNs in starting URL, landing URL, redirection
chain, loaded content (logged links) and HREF links. We
expect legitimate webpages to use more internal RDNs and
less redirection than phishing webpages [16].
Webpage content: Finally, five features (f5) count the number
of terms in the text and the title (2), and the number of input
fields, images and IFrames (3) in the page. Phishing pages
tend to have minimal text to circumvent text-based detection
techniques [17] and use more images and HTML content
loaded from other sources. In addition, since phishing attacks
seek to steal user data, phishing webpages often contain
several input fields [6].
It is worth noting that while we use terms to compute
our feature set, it is not based on any observed language or
term usage knowledge. The computation relies solely on the
information gathered through a web browser albeit we use a
local copy of Alexa ranking list. Hence, it makes the feature
set adaptable and usable as well as fast to compute once the
data sources are available. Since the feature set is small (212)
we expect it to have good generalizability.
C. Phishing Detection Model
To use our feature set for discriminating phishing from
legitimate webpages, we use a supervised machine learning
approach. In supervised machine learning, a classification
model is learned from observations over a set of data labeled
with several classes. The learned model is used to predict the
class of unlabeled instances. We select Gradient Boosting [18]
to build the classification model. Boosting [19] is a fitting
procedure that improves the prediction of binary outcomes
from weak models using weighted ensembles of base-learners.
It was selected because [20] (a) of its strong ability to select
and weight the most relevant features given a set of base
learners and (b) boosting algorithms are known to be fairly
robust to overfitting, enabling the resulting model to have good
generalization capabilities.
Gradient Boosting consists in an iterative process where the
starting point is an initial estimation of a prediction function
that fits poorly the learning data set. During each iteration, the
function is improved by fitting a new base-learner (decision
tree) to the negative gradient of a pre-specified loss function.
Gradient boosting improves model accuracy by selecting vari-
ables and weak models at each iteration. At the end of the
iterative process, the final prediction function combines the
best weak learners and variables as part of the model.
Gradient Boosting predicts the class of an unknown instance
by computing values defined in [0, 1] that gives the confidence
of the instance to belong to a given class. In the case of
predicting only two classes, the confidence value v1 for one
class is equal to 1− v2, where v2 is the confidence value for
the other class. A discrimination threshold predicts, according
to the computed confidence values, the class of an instance. By
tuning this threshold, we can favor the prediction of one class
over the other. The variation of the discrimination threshold
over [0, 1] is used to evaluate the accuracy of a given model
by examining how false positive rate varies with true positive
rate (ROC) or precision varies with recall.
V. TARGET IDENTIFICATION
The identification of the target of a phishing webpage relies
on a set of “keyterms” in that webpage related to a brand or
service. Rather than leveraging any brand-specific knowledge
or text corpus to infer these keyterms [21], [22], we introduce
a new technique that uses only the information extracted from
the webpage. We now discuss in detail how these keyterms
are extracted and used.
A. Keyterms Extraction
A keyterm is one that appears in several data sources (e.g.,
title, text and landing URL) on a page. We use terms from
five data sources introduced in Section II-C that contain user-
visible data rendered by the browser:
• Starting and landing URLs:
Tstart ∪ Tstartrdn ∪ Tland ∪ Tlandrdn
• Title: Ttitle
• Text: Ttext
• Copyright: Tcopyright
• HREF links: Tintlink ∪ Textlink
We use three different techniques to identify keyterms. They
are used in sequence, depending on the information available
in different data sources and the success of each technique
(Section V-B).
The first considers the result of pairwise intersection be-
tween the five sets of terms as potential keyterms. Each term
appearing in at least two data sources is added to a list
and ranked in descending order according to a term’s overall
frequency in the visible parts of the website. The top-N terms
in the ordered list are selected as keyterms. (We use N=5 in our
model as it was proved to be a sufficient number to represent a
webpage [13].) These N keyterms are called boosted prominent
terms.
The second technique considers the same data sources
but discards the intersection between text and HREF links
(Ttext ∩ (Tintlink ∪ Textlink)). Sometimes text and links of
a webpage contain the same terms because the name of the
links and the corresponding URL can be the same. This is a
common practice in news websites. In this case the intersection
terms may be dominated by terms that are irrelevant for target
identification and it introduces some noise in the keyterms
inference. The N extracted keyterms using this technique are
called prominent terms.
The last technique applies optical character recognition to
the webpage screenshot to produce Timage. This set of terms
is intersected with the five other sets to produce the list of top-
N keyterms being OCR prominent terms. This data source is
not used in a first step because OCR is a slow process. Terms
extraction from text is much faster.
B. Identification Process
We now discuss how the extracted keyterms lists (boosted
prominent terms, prominent terms and OCR prominent terms)
are used to infer the target of a phishing webpage.
Step 1: Extract boosted prominent terms, and try to “guess”
the target FQDN. The mlds from the starting and landing
URLs, from the logged links and HREF links are collected.
Then, every collected mld is checked to figure out if it can be
composed based on the keyterms part of boosted prominent
terms possibly separated by a dash ‘-’ or a string of digits.
Most commercial URLs are made of a domain name that
is their company’s name. For instance, the registered domain
of Bank of America is bankofamerica.com, and the boosted
prominent terms extracted from the front page of this website
include the terms bank, of, america. For each guessed FQDN
(typically 2-3), a search engine query is performed and the
returned RDNs are stored. If the RDNs of the suspected
phishing site (starting and landing URL) appear in the results
of the search engine query, we declare this site legitimate and
stop the process. Otherwise we go to step 2. This decision
is based on the assumption that a search engine would not
return a phishing site as a top hit because (a) a new phishing
site (only a few hours old) would not have been indexed by
a search engine yet and (b) an old phishing site would have
been already detected and ended up in a blacklist.
Step 2: The set of N prominent terms is queried against a
search engine. If the suspected RDN appears in the set of
RDNs returned by the search engine, it is declared legitimate
and we stop the process. If some mlds resulting form the
search engine query appear in a controlled data source of
the webpage, we record them and go to step 5. These mlds
represent the candidate targets. Otherwise, continue to step 3.
Step 3: Repeat Step 2 but instead of using prominent terms,
use boosted prominent terms. If the webpage is not confirmed
as legitimate and no candidate target is found, go to step 4.
Step 4: Repeat Step 2 but instead of using prominent terms,
use OCR prominent terms. If the webpage is not confirmed as
legitimate, go to step 5.
Step 5 (target selection): For each mld candidate target, we
count how many times it appears in the data sources of the
webpage and rank it in a list according to this criteria. If a
single target is required, we return the most frequent (top-1).
If we want to improve the likelihood that the real target is not
missed, the top-2 or top-3 most frequent mlds can be returned.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of the
phishing detection system and the target identification method
presented in Sections IV and V respectively. We first describe
the experimental setup and datasets used for experiments
before evaluating each system individually and presenting the
performance of the association of both system.
A. Experimental Setup
Our system is composed of five Python modules:
Webpage scraper is only required for experiments to gather
the information sources defined in Section II-C. It can also
be used for offline analysis. The scraper is implemented as a
monitored Firefox web browser (Selenium4) that extracts the
data sources while visiting a webpage at a given URL. It saves
the data in json format and a screenshot of the webpage. Using
such setup ensures client-side only implementability.
Feature extractor extracts the 212 features (Section IV-B)
from the data sources in the webpage gathered by the scraper
and builds a feature vector.
Classifier takes the feature vector and a previously learned
classification model as input to predict the class, phishing or
legitimate, of a webpage. The implementation of the Gradient
Boosting is provided by the Scikit Learn5 Python package.
We set the discrimination threshold to 0.7, which favors
the prediction of legitimate webpages ([0, 0.7[) over phishs
([0.7, 1]).
Keyterms extractor infers the keyterms of a webpage using
data gathered by the scraper.
Target identifier predicts the likelihood of a webpage being a
phish. In case of a phish, the modules also identifies its target.
B. Evaluation Datasets
We obtained URLs from two sources in order to gather
ground truth data of phishing and legitimate webpages (Table
V). Neither dataset contains personal data. Both datasets are
available on request for research use.
The phishing URL sets (Phish) were obtained through the
community website PhishTank. We conducted three different
collection “campaigns”. The first resulted in phishTrain which
was used for training the phishing detection classifier. The
second, collected at a later point in time, resulted in phishTest
which was used as the test set. The last, phishBrand, was used
for evaluating our target identification scheme (Section VI-D).
4Selenium HQ (http://www.seleniumhq.org/)
5Scikit Learn (http://scikit-learn.org/)
It consists of 600 phishing webpages for each of which we
manually identified the target, resulting in a total of 126
different targets. Each campaign consisted of checking for new
entries in PhishTank every hour and scraping the webpages
for those URLs. These are in several languages. The datasets
were further manually cleaned to remove any legitimate or
unavailable websites and parked domain names. Table V
provides a detailed description of these datasets including the
date and the count of elements before and after cleaning.
TABLE V: Datasets description
Set Name Date (2015) Initial Clean
Phish phishTrain Jul-23/Aug-3 1213 1036
phishTest Sep-13/Sep-24 1553 1216
phishBrand Sep-22/Sep-28 600 600
Leg legTrain Jul-15/Jul-22 5000 4531
English Aug-17/Sep-23 100,000 –
French Sep-28 10,000 –
German Sep-29 10,000 –
Italian Sep-30 10,000 –
Portuguese Oct-1 10,000 –
Spanish Oct-2 10,000 –
The legitimate URLs (Leg) were provided by Intel Secu-
rity6. We processed them same way as for the phishing URLs.
Intel gave us several datasets. First, an English training set
(legTrain) of 5,000 legitimate webpages was cleaned up to
remove unavailable websites and dead links. Six larger test sets
of webpages in different languages (English, French, German,
Portuguese, Italian and Spanish) were gathered and did not
receive any cleaning treatment. A detailed description of these
sets is provided in Table V as well. The variety and popularity
of the URLs in the test set is reflected in the fact that 65,302
(43.5%) of the 150,000 test URLs in Leg have RDNs ranked
in Alexa top 1M.
C. Phishing Webpage Classification
We now present detailed evaluation of our phishing detec-
tion method. We focus on three primary aspects of classifi-
cation performance. First is accuracy which entails precision,
recall and false positive rate. Second is Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC), which shows the change of false posi-
tive rate with respect to true positive rate. Third is scalability
where we evaluate how accuracy changes as we scale from
small to large test datasets. We evaluate the performance of
our method across six different languages so as to demonstrate
its language independence. We also evaluate each feature
set in Table III independently in order to provide insights
into the type of features that are most or least valuable in
phishing detection. Two scenarios are used for evaluation.
The first (scenario1) is a 5 fold cross-validation on legTrain
and phishTrain datasets. The second (scenario2) consists of
the same learning stage on legTrain and phishTrain (5,567
webpages), being the oldest captured datasets. Prediction is
based on phishTest and each individual language-specific test
dataset of legitimate URLs.
6Intel Security (http://www.intelsecurity.com/)
TABLE VI: Detailed accuracy evaluation for six languages
Language Pre. Recall F1-score FP Rate AUC
English 0.956 0.958 0.957 0.0005 0.999
French 0.970 0.958 0.964 0.0036 0.997
German 0.981 0.958 0.970 0.0022 0.998
Portuguese 0.967 0.958 0.962 0.004 0.997
Italian 0.982 0.958 0.970 0.0021 0.998
Spanish 0.982 0.958 0.970 0.0021 0.998
1) Accuracy: Evaluation across languages: The detailed
evaluation results for precision, recall and false positive rate,
using legitimate datasets of six different languages with sce-
nario2 are shown in Table VI. These values were obtained by
setting the discrimination threshold of Gradient Boosting to
0.7. In this table, we see that our method achieves significantly
high precision for all languages (0.95–0.98). This holds for
recall as well (around 0.95). Hence, the F1-score, which is
the harmonic mean of precision and recall, is also significantly
high (0.95–0.97). The false positive rate is significantly low,
i.e., in the range of 0.0005–0.004, across all languages.
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Fig. 4: ROC evaluation results for six languages
In many large-scale, real-world scenarios (especially in web
security domain), a machine learning model is considered
usable only if it achieves high precision (e.g., 0.9 or 0.95)
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Fig. 2: Accuracy evaluation results for each feature set, including (a) Recall, (b) Precision, (c) False Positive Rate
TABLE VII: Detailed accuracy evaluation for different feature sets
Scenario Metrics Categories of feature sets
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f1,5 f2,3,4 fall
Precision 0.982 0.943 0.747 0.891 0.880 0.983 0.928 0.991
Cross-validation Recall 0.932 0.852 0.750 0.730 0.656 0.948 0.901 0.957
(legTrain/ F1-score 0.957 0.896 0.749 0.803 0.752 0.966 0.915 0.974
phishTrain) FP Rate 0.003 0.011 0.057 0.020 0.020 0.003 0.015 0.001
AUC 0.996 0.989 0.958 0.970 0.944 0.997 0.991 0.998
English
Precision 0.823 0.790 0.296 0.288 0.268 0.879 0.832 0.956
Recall 0.961 0.858 0.601 0.502 0.260 0.958 0.847 0.958
F1-score 0.887 0.823 0.397 0.367 0.264 0.917 0.840 0.957
FP Rate 0.002 0.002 0.017 0.015 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.0005
AUC 0.997 0.995 0.974 0.962 0.899 0.997 0.994 0.999
with significant recall (e.g., 0.5 or 0.6) [23]. In order to test
our method against this criterion, we evaluated how recall of
the proposed method changes with precision by varying the
discrimination threshold from 0 to 1. The result is shown in
Fig. 3 where we see that when the precision is higher than 0.9,
the recall for all languages is significantly high and is always
in the range of 0.64–0.98. This shows that from the accuracy
perspective, our method is readily applicable in large-scale,
multi-lingual business scenarios.
Evaluation across feature sets: For evaluating each feature
set individually, we experimented scenario1 (cross-validation)
and scenario2 with the English dataset (English). The latter
scenario corresponds to a real world scenario where the ratio of
legitimate webpages to phishs is 85/1 as it has been observed
while analyzing real world traffic (90/1) in previous work
[1]. The evaluation results for both these experiments using a
discrimination threshold set to 0.7, with respect to precision,
recall and false positive rate of each feature set are shown in
Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2b, we see that, out of all feature sets (i.e.,
f1,f2,f3,f4,f5), f1 yields the highest precision whereas f3
or f5 yield the lowest precision. But, note that for English
dataset, the precision of f1 is 0.82 which is not as high as it
is for cross-validation. In this case, the rest of the feature sets
(i.e., f2, f3, f4, and f5) become significantly important, as
combining them together in fall increases the precision from
0.82 (achieved by f1) to 0.95 (achieved by fall). On similar
lines, we see in Fig. 2a that out of all individual feature sets,
f1 performs the best in terms of recall as well whereas f5
performs the worst. The detailed results can also be seen in
highlighted text in Table VII. We can see that the overall recall
of the proposed method, achieved by using fall, is significantly
high and higher than 0.95.
Fig. 2c shows the false positive rate of each feature set
wherein we see that the overall false positive rate of the
proposed method (obtained by using feature set fall) is very
low, i.e., in the range of 0.0005–0.001, which illustrates the
practical applicability of the method in real-world scenarios. It
is of note that for a large dataset like English, the false positive
rate of the method is as low as 0.0005. This can be mainly
attributed to feature set f1 and f2, both of which yield very
low false positive rate. This is also shown in Table VII where
we see that, just like for precision and recall, feature set f3
individually yields the least performance which indicates that
features based on usage of starting and landing mld, if used
by themselves, are not good indicators of a phishing website,
and must be used in conjunction with other features.
Evaluation across feature sets: For evaluating each feature
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Fig. 5: ROC evaluation for different feature sets: (a) f1, (b) f2, (c) f3, (d) f4, (e) f5, (f) f1,5, (g) f2,3,4, (h) fall
set individually, we experimented scenario1 (cross-validation)
and scenario2 with the English dataset (English). The latter
scenario corresponds to a real world scenario where the ratio of
legitimate webpages to phishs is 85/1 as it has been observed
while analyzing real world traffic (90/1) in previous work [1].
Detailed performance results, for a discrimination threshold
of 0.7, are provided in Table VII where we highlight the
maximum and minimum precision, recall and false positive
rate for each scenario. We see that out of all individual feature
sets (i.e., f1,f2,f3,f4,f5), f1 yields the maximum precision,
whereas f3 or f5 yield the minimum precision. But, note that
for English dataset, the precision of f1 is 0.82 which is not
as high as it is for cross-validation. In this case, the rest of
the feature sets (i.e., f2, f3, f4, and f5) become significantly
important, as combining them together in fall increases the
precision from 0.82 (achieved by f1) to 0.95 (achieved by
fall). On similar lines, we see that out of all individual
feature sets, f1 performs the best in terms of recall as well
whereas f5 performs the worst. The overall false positive
rate of the proposed method (obtained by using feature set
fall) is very low (0.0005–0.001), which illustrates the practical
applicability of the method in real-world scenarios. Note that
for a large dataset like English, the false positive rate of the
method is as low as 0.0005. This can be mainly attributed
to feature set f1 and f2, both of which yield very low false
positive rate.
2) ROC: Another metric for predictive performance of
the proposed method is ROC and corresponding AUC (Area
Under the Curve). Along the lines of accuracy evaluation, we
examine the ROC and AUC metrics across all languages, and
across individual feature sets. Evaluation across languages:
The objective of ROC evaluation is to examine the increase
in false positive rate with the increase in true positive rate
while varying the discrimination threshold of the classifier.
The evaluation results using scenario2 for all languages are
shown in Fig. 4. We see that, at the significantly high true
positive rate of 0.9, the false positive rate for all languages
is less than 0.008 which is considered quite low. As the true
positive rate increases to around 0.95, the false positive rate
does not increase much. Even at true positive rate of 0.98,
the false positive rate stays substantially low at 0.02. In line
with these results, the AUC is around 0.999 for all languages,
as shown in Table VI. It may be noted that these results are
consistent across all languages, which is very desirable in a
multi-lingual phishing detection scenario.
Evaluation across feature sets: For ROC evaluation of
individual feature sets, we used the same experimental setup
as we did for accuracy evaluation across feature sets, i.e., sce-
nario1 (cross-validation) and scenario2 with English dataset
(English). The results are shown in Fig. 5. We see that,
similar to accuracy evaluation results, feature f1 performs the
best as it has maximum area under ROC curve in both the
scenarios whereas features f3 and f5 perform the least in
both the scenarios. This indicates that in this type of scenario,
features based on usage of starting and landing mld (i.e., f3)
and features based on webpage content (i.e., f5), if used by
themselves, are not good indicators of a phishing website, and
must be used in conjunction with other features.
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Fig. 6: Performance vs the scale of data
3) Scalability: We now examine the effect of scale on
the predictive performance of our method, i.e., if the size of
the test dataset increases considerably with time, then what
effect does it have on the precision, recall and false positive
rate? This evaluation is especially important for verifying
the practical usability of the method because in real-world,
business scenarios, machine learning models are trained once
and then tested or applied on large, and often streaming, sets
of data which rapidly increase with time. In such problem
scenarios, the learnt model must be able to scale well with
the increase in the size of datasets.
In order to perform this scalability evaluation, we use
scenario2 (5,567 training instances) and initialize our test set
with 10,000 legitimate and 100 phishing examples extracted
randomly from the English dataset and phishTest respectively.
Thereafter, we iteratively increment the size of the test set
by 10,000 legitimate webpages and 100 phishs randomly
picked from the remaining instances of the English dataset
and phishTest.
This helps us in examining how the predictive performance
of our phishing detection model changes as we increase the
size of test set from 10,100 to 101,000. The results are shown
in Fig. 6, where we see that precision as well as recall increase
with scale, whereas the false positive rate decreases. This
indicates that the increase in the number of errors (i.e., false
positives and false negatives) is significantly less than the
increase in the size of test set, which causes the increase in
overall precision and recall and decrease in the false positive
rate as we scale up the size of test set. This kind of predictive
performance on large test set, while learning a model from a
small training set, is exactly what is required in a desirable
machine learning model that is deemed fit for usage in large-
scale practical scenarios.
Median Average StDev
Webpage scraping 12787 12798 4898
Loading data 1 2 2
Features extraction 890 1282 1586
Classification < 1 < 1 < 1
Total (no scraping) 891 1283 1588
TABLE VIII: Processing time (milliseconds)
Table VIII depicts the median, average and standard devia-
tion of the time taken by each operation involved in phishing
webpage classification on a laptop with 2.7GHz Intel Core
i5 processor and 16GB memory. We can see that most of
the time is dedicated to webpage scraping, which is not part
of the classification process in the case of client-side imple-
mentation. Except that, the total median classification time is
891 milliseconds, showing that the system is able to render
a decision in less than 1 second. These performance figures
are based on a standalone Python prototype. Subsequently, we
also implemented an optimized JavaScript version as a browser
add-on which exhibits better performance characteristics [3].
D. Target Identification
To assess the performance of target identification, we used
the 600 phishing webpages of phishBrand. Since target iden-
tification can provide up to three candidate targets for an
analyzed webpage, we evaluate the likelihood of the correct
target being part of top-1, top-2 and top-3 results provided by
our scheme. Table IX presents the count of correctly identified
targets, unknown targets and missed targets considering these
three sets. The last column gives the success rate of each
method. The 17 pages with unknown target corresponds to
webpages including only some input fields and no hint about
the target. We were not able to infer the target with manual
analysis. We assume that links to these webpages were pro-
vided in phishing emails that contained the information about
the target. These webpages with unknown targets are thus
included in the computing of the success rate. The accuracy of
identifying the correct target (top-1) is 90.5%. If the criteria
is identifying the correct target among a possible set of 3
(top-3) then the accuracy increases to 97.3%. 311 phishing
webpages had only one identified potential target (top-1) and
no alternative targets. These results are comparable to the
best state of the art method for target identification [22]
that reaches a 92.1% success rate. However, our method is
significantly faster to compute, since it it does not require
crawling additional websites to infer the target of a given
phish.
TABLE IX: Target identification results
Targets Identified Unknown Missed Success rate
top-1 526 17 57 90.5%
top-2 558 17 25 95.8%
top-3 567 17 16 97.3%
To see how the target identification system can comple-
ment our phishing detection system we fed the former with
misclassified legitimate webpages identified in Section VI-C
when assessing phishing detection in scenario2 with the
English dataset. 53 out of 100,000 legitimate webpages were
misclassified. The target identification system identified four of
these as phish with an identified target. 10 were considered as
suspicious (no target identified and no legitimate confirmation)
and 39 were confirmed as legitimate.
Considering these results, using the target identification in a
second step for instances identified as phishs by the phishing
detection system can be beneficial. On the English dataset,
it would reduce the false positive rate to 0.0001, which is
equal to the best state-of-the-art phishing detection system
[1]. However, according to accuracy in target identification
(97.3%) it would as well reduce the number of identified
phishs while keeping precision and recall over 0.90.
VII. DISCUSSION
Analyzing the design and the evaluation results of phishing
classification and target identification, we draw some conclu-
sion and discuss the limitations of this technique as well as
potential adversarial attacks.
A. Relevance of Feature Sets
We have seen in Section VI-C that our features set yielded
results that outperform previous work. The main reason for
this improvement is the new separation scheme applied to
data sources related to their level of control and constraints
(Section III-A). This is evident from the performances of the
feature set f1 that comprises URL related features separated
accordingly to constraint and control considerations. The con-
sistency checking in term usage represented by f2 showed very
good performances as well and the combination of all feature
sets (fall) yielded comparable results to the best existing
techniques [1], while relying on less features and training data.
In addition, we assessed that our feature set meets the
requirements introduced in Section IV-A. It has good gen-
eralizability being able to learn a classification model from
few thousand instances and accurately predicting the class
of 100,000+ unknown webpages. It is adaptable and lan-
guage/brand independent achieving comparable performances
across different languages. It is usable as it does not rely on
online access to centralized information and is fast to render a
decision with a median processing time lower than 1 second.
B. Limitations
The main strength of our technique, its language indepen-
dence, is though its main weakness. We did not want to rely
on any dictionary to extract terms. We chose to split strings
according to any characters that are not part of the English
dictionary and to only consider terms composed of at least
three characters to discard stop words and recurrent short
terms having no meaning. This raised some issues in term
distribution comparisons. Long subdomains such as theinstan-
texchange or insuranceservicenow were considered as single
term. In contrast, short domain name string corresponding to
brand and composed of separating characters (digit, hyphen,
etc.) such as dl4a, s2mr or e-go were split and the resulting
terms were discarded as too short. The inconsistent usage
of abbreviations or acronyms like intl for international or
pfa for premier financial online also had a negative impact.
Similarity of synonyms cannot be inferred. Most misclassified
legitimate webpages (>50%) had one of these characteristics.
Despite these misclassifications we achieve a low false positive
rate (0.0005). Many of these misclassified instances can be
identified as legitimate by the target identification system.
A second limitation relates to the identification of some
empty/unavailable webpages and parked domain names as
phishs. The former is explained by the lack of information
contained in empty/unavailable webpages. The text and title
contents are almost empty and few outgoing links or external
resources (logged links) are loaded in these pages. Several
parked domain names are domains that have been used for
malicious purposes like phishing [24] and are thus obfuscated
FQDNs registered to trap users. Moreover, parked domain
names use similar composition schemes and obfuscation tech-
niques as phishing domains [25] such as typosquatting [26],
[27]. In addition to this similarity in domain names and URLs
composition, parked domain names and phishing domain
names have other common characteristics. Parked domains are
involved in advertisement networks [28] and the delivered ad
content tends to be correlated with the domain name parked,
for instance ads for Amazon Inc. are delivered for the RDN
amaaon.com. From the point of view of our classification
system, these parked pages have the same characteristics
as phishing pages. This misclassification of unavailable and
parked domain names is not of major concern since, for the
former no content access is prohibited by the system since the
link point empty resources. For the latter, domain parking is
considered as an activity that provide very little unique content
and is considered as spam by Google [29]. Nevertheless,
some efficient state-of-the-art techniques [25] or the target
identification system can be applied to discard these webpages
from phishing identification.
A last limitation was the low accuracy observed in classi-
fication of IP-based phishing URLs. Out of 25 such URLs in
phishTest, only 19 were correctly classified rendering a lower
recall (0.76) than the global recall presented by the system
(>0.95). The reason is that FQDNs based term distributions
for such URLs are empty leading to several null features.
However, such URLs represent less than 2% (41) of the
URLs present in all phishing datasets and is thus not a major
limitation.
Although we did not observe this in our datasets, webpages
whose content is in one alphabet and URL in another may
be misclassified. So far we have only tested webpages in
European languages. Classifier performance on pages in other
languages may be lower.
C. Evasion Techniques
As we saw, one way to evade detection is to use IP-based
URLs. These are less likely to be detected by our system.
However, relying on IP address rather than domain names
deprives phishers from the flexibility brought by the DNS to
change the hosting location of their phishing content while
keeping the same link. Moreover, IP blacklisting is widely
used to prevent access to malicious hosting infrastructure, so
phishers would have to face other issues.
Another evasion technique is to limit the text content
available in a webpage: use few external links, do not load
external content and build short URLs [30]. We observed
some of these techniques actually being used individually in
webpages of both phishing datasets used for evaluation. They
did not impact classifier performance because even though
they prevent some features from being computed, others, such
as those based on title, starting/landing URL and logged links
could still lead to effective detection of phishs. Simultaneous
use of multiple evasion techniques may impact classifier
performance. However, using such subterfuges would impact
the quality of the phishing webpage and reduce the number
of victims.
Image based webpages is another technique to limit text
content. While such webpages can be identified by some
features of our model, it would make the identification process
harder. A solution to cope with this is to use OCR to extract
the text content from the webpage screenshot.
A final probable evasion technique is to use typosquatting
domains and misspelled terms in the different data sources
we analyze. When different but similar terms like paypal,
paypaI or paipal are used in different sources, our distribu-
tions comparison metric would not infer any similarity. The
classifier would thus probably conclude that the webpage is
legitimate. However, the presence of references to the target
would disclose the real target. In addition, misspellings may
tip-off potential victims.
For target identification, the best evasion technique is not
to provide any indication about the target in the webpage and
rather focus on using lures in the message containing the
link to the fake website. But this has two negative effects,
first, the phishing webpage seems less legitimate and second,
the phisher exposes himself to alternative target identification
techniques applied to other content than webpages [17].
VIII. RELATED WORK
The obfuscation and mimicry characteristics of phishing
webpages have been the basis of several solutions proposed
for phishing detection and target identification.
Phishing webpage detection: Analysis of the content [6],
[13] and code execution (e.g. the use of javascript, pop-up
windows, etc.) [34], [35] of a webpage provides relevant
information to identify phishing webpages. Some detection
methods rely on URL lexical obfuscation characteristics [8],
[9], [36] and webpage hosting related features [32], [37], [38]
to render a decision about the legitimacy of a webpage. Other
methods [39] study the global interactions of users with a
given webpage to infer its maliciousness. The visual similarity
of a phishing webpage with its target was also exploited to
detect phishs [33], [40], [41]. These phishing detection based
on visual similarity presuppose that a potential target is known
a priori. In contrast, our approach is to discover the target.
Multi-criteria methods [1], [12], [38] have been proved the
most efficient to detect phishing websites. These techniques
use a combination of webpage features (HTML terms, links,
frame, etc.), connection features (HTML header, redirection,
etc.) and host based features (DNS, IP, ASN, geolocation,
etc.) to infer webpage legitimacy. They are implemented as
offline systems checking content pointed by URLs to auto-
matically build blacklists. This process induces a delay of
several hours [1] that is problematic in the context of phishing
detection, since phishing attacks have a median lifetime of a
few hours [10]. In addition, it is reportedly costly [12] and
use [1] some proprietary features (e.g. Google PageRank [42])
preventing usage on the end-user devices. The identification
method uses machine learning techniques fed with hundreds
of thousands of features. These features are mostly static
and learned from training sets containing data such as IP
address, Autonomous System Number (ASN), bag-of-words
for different data sources (webpage, URL, etc.). This limits
the generalizability of the approach as it requires large training
datasets, numbering hundreds of thousand of webpages [1],
[12].
Other methods focused, as we do, on the study of terms
that compose the data sources of a webpage [8], [9], [36],
[43]. Cantina [13], [31] was among the first systems to
propose a lexical analysis of terms that compose a webpage. In
Cantina [13] key terms are selected using TF-IDF to provide
a unique signature of a webpage. Using this signature in a
search engine, Cantina infers the legitimacy of a webpage.
A similar method [6], based on TF-IDF and Google search,
checks for inconsistency between a webpage identity and the
identity it impersonates to identify phish. The main difference
between these methods and ours is language independence
since these methods rely on TF-IDF computation to infer their
keyterms. Moreover, they rely on centralized infrastructure
through search engines query to classify a webpage, while
we apply a comparison in term usage only between sources
that compose a webpage.
Table X presents comparative performances results of our
phishing detection system to the most relevant state-of-the-art
systems. It presents the size of the testing sets used to evaluate
each system and the provenance of the legitimate set, showing
how representative the set is. For example, using popular
websites (such as top Alexa sites) [21], [33] as the legitimate
set is not representative. The ratio of training to testing
instances indicates the scalability of the method and the ratio
of legitimate to phishing instances shows the extent to which
the experiments represents a real world distribution (≈ 100/1).
We also identify the evaluation method (e.g., cross validation
vs. training with old data and testing with new data). Finally,
we present several metrics for assessing the classification
performance. If data for any of the columns were missing from
the original paper describing the system, we estimated them.
For comparison purposes, if several experimental setups were
proposed in a paper, we selected the most relevant to assess
their practical efficacy using the following ordered criteria:
1) learning and testing instances are different,
2) the ratio of legitimate to phishing in the testing set is
representative of real world observations (≈ 100/1),
3) the learning set is older than the testing set,
4) the false positive rate (FPR) is minimized.
We can see that among the eight most relevant state-of-
the-art techniques, only two [1], [32] have comparable false
positive rates to ours (≤ 0.001). A low false positive rate is
paramount for a phishing detection technique, since this relates
to the proportion of legitimate webpages to which a user will
be incorrectly denied. The technique proposed by Ma et al.
[32] has a lower accuracy than in our system (0.955 < 0.999).
In addition, they use a testing set that does not represent real
world distribution (3 legs/4 phishs) and use a cross-validation
that does not assess scalability of the approach with a 1/1 ratio
for learning to testing instances. Whittaker et al. [1] report
results similar to us in several metrics. However, they use a
huge training set (>9M instances) and their test set is actually
smaller than the training set (a sixth, at 1.5M)! Scalability and
language-independence are likely to be poor since they use
100,000 mostly static features (bag-of-words).
In contrast to the state-of-the-art in phishing detection, our
solution is language independent, scalable, requires training
sets that are much smaller than the test sets and does not
rely on real-time access to external sources, while performing
Testing set Legitimate Train Leg
Technique Legitimate Phish set /Test /Phish Evaluation FPR Pre. Recall Acc.
Cantina [13] 2,100 19 English - 110/1 no learning 0.03 0.212 0.89 0.969
Cantina+ [31] 1,868 940 several 1/4 2/1 old/new 0.013 0.964 0.955 0.97
Xiang et al. [6] 7,906 3,543 several - 2/1 no learning 0.019 0.957 0.9 0.955
Ma et al. [32] 15,000 20,500 DMOZ 1/1 3/4 cross-valid 0.001 0.998 0.924 0.955
Whittaker et al. [1] 1,499,109 16,967 several 6/1 90/1 old/new 0.0001 0.989 0.915 0.999
Thomas et al. [12] 500,000 500,000 several 4/1 1/1 cross-valid 0.003 0.961 0.734 0.866
Ramesh et al. [21] 1,200 3,374 top Alexa - 1/3 no learning 0.005 0.998 0.996 0.996
Chen et al. [33] 404 1,945 top Alexa 9/1 1/5 cross-valid 0.007 0.992 1 0.994
Our method 100,000 1,216 English 1/18 85/1 old/new 0.0005 0.956 0.958 0.999
Our method 150,000 1,216 several 1/27 125/1 old/new 0.001 0.857 0.958 0.998
Our method 4,531 1,036 English 4/1 4/1 cross-valid 0.001 0.991 0.957 0.99
TABLE X: Phishing detection system performances comparison
better than or as well as the state-of-the-art.
Target identification: This is a challenging problem that
has not been addressed widely in the literature. One proposal
[21] was to use a similar technique as Cantina with keywords
retrieval and Google search to discover a list of potential target
as the top results of the search, but the authors do not report
accuracy figures for target identification. The HREF links of
the page are further studied to infer if the webpage is likely to
be a phish or not and deduce the target. HREF links have been
used to build community graphs of webpages. By counting the
mutual links between two webpages and further performing
visual similarity analysis between suspicious webpages, Liu
et al. [22] identify the target of a given phishing website
with an accuracy of 92.1%. However, this technique is slow
because of the need to crawl many additional websites to build
the community graph. Conditional Random Fields and Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [44] have been applied to phishing
email content to identify their target [17] with a success rate
of 88.1%.
The technique we propose, in contrast to previous tech-
niques is language independent for keyterms inference. It is as
efficient as any state-of-the-art solutions achieving a maximum
success rate of 90.5-97.3%.
IX. CONCLUSION
We presented novel techniques for efficiently and economi-
cally identifying phishing webpages and their targets. By using
a set of features that capture inherent limitations that phishers
face, our system has excellent performance and scalability
while requiring much smaller amounts of training data. We
have also implemented a fully client-side phishing prevention
browser add-on implementing this technique [3].
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